5 July 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Demech
PFIAB Staff

STAT FROM: [redacted]
EA/EXDIR

SUBJECT: Recent Speeches by the DCI

Fred,

1. In light of your and Ambassador Armstrong's previously expressed interest, attached are some recent speeches given by the DCI on intelligence issues.

2. The speeches were given by the DCI to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) (10 April), the TIME Executive News Conference (18 April), and the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA) (1 June). In the AFIO speech, the DCI discusses the nature of the intelligence business today, while in the TIME speech he discusses several current intelligence issues. In the SASA address, the DCI honors Admiral Bobby R. Inman, this year's recipient of the Association's William O. Baker Award.

STAT [redacted]

Attachments

B-801-1R

DCI EXEC REG

ER 89-2682

DDCI - RK

26 June 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

FROM: James W. Greenleaf
Director, Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Recent Speeches by the DCI

1. The Public Affairs Office regularly disseminates speeches given by the DCI on intelligence issues.

2. The attached speeches were given by the DCI to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) (10 April), the TIME Executive News Conference (18 April), and the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA) (1 June). In the AFIO speech, the DCI discusses the nature of the intelligence business today, while in the TIME speech he discusses several current intelligence issues. In the SASA address, the DCI honors Admiral Bobby R. Inman, this year's recipient of the Association's William O. Baker Award.

3. If you have any questions or comments about these speeches, please
STAT contact [redacted] Chief of our Speeches Unit. She can be reached at
STAT [redacted]

4. I encourage you to send these speeches to others in your office who may wish to know what the DCI is saying in his public appearances.

STAT [redacted]

James W. Greenleaf

STAT [redacted]

Attachments:
As stated

DCI EXEC REG

R-501-1R

REMARKS

BY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

APRIL 10, 1989

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/15 : CIA-RDP91B01306R000400110008-8

Thank you very much, Walter.* It's great to be here and see such a tremendous group that means so much to us in supporting what we're doing today. I'm particularly pleased that you took time to mention Justice Powell's honorary board membership. We've been great friends. Some of you may not know that because of his background in ULTRA and in intelligence I selected him to administer the oath of office when I was making my move from the FBI to the Central Intelligence Agency. He wrote me a letter and said that being DCI was the only job that he had ever really aspired to. I offered to trade, but it was a little late.

I was here in 1986, three years ago, wearing another hat. A great deal has happened since that time. But it's nice to look out and see Ray Wannall and Ed O'Malley and to realize that the FBI is very much a player in AFIO, just as it is in the Intelligence Community. Later, perhaps, I can talk a little bit about what we are doing in the Intelligence Community together -- not just CIA and FBI, but NSA and DIA and all the military services.

During these last two years, I have traveled more than I anticipated, and I have spoken with many groups around this country and overseas -- from academic forums to congressional committees to groups inside the bubbles in embassies around the world -- but I am especially pleased to be here today.

* Walter Pforzheimer, Chairman, Board of Directors, Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

This group, I know, understands as I have come to understand the special privilege and the special satisfaction of serving in intelligence. And you, of all others, understand that what we need to produce good intelligence is a clear mission, talented people, sufficient resources, and the ability to protect our sources and our methods. I'd like to talk to you this afternoon about what we've been doing and why we've been doing it, and why, in spite of the occasional slings and arrows of outrageous publicity, more people than ever before are interested in intelligence work.

Before I do that, however, I'd like to take this opportunity to say just a few words about John Greaney, who has contributed so much to intelligence and to AFIO over the years. John couldn't be with us today -- I understand he's in Europe -- but I'm sure he wouldn't mind my reading you a letter that I have sent to him.

I told John: "I would like to express my great appreciation for the exceptional support you have given to the intelligence profession during your eight and a half years as Executive Director of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

"In your dealings with the media, the Congress, and the public, you have done much to promote understanding and support of the Intelligence Community and our vital mission. I would like to especially recognize your instrumental role in managing AFIO's Academic Assistance Program. This program is proving very successful in helping to educate our nation's youth on the role and functions of intelligence. The relationships that AFIO is establishing with college professors around the nation also help the academic community to

appreciate how much the Intelligence Community can benefit from their expertise, ideas, and perspectives on the issues we face.

"I commend you for your dedication, your professionalism, and your patriotism in almost 38 years of service to and support of intelligence. Please accept my best wishes for your future success."

I wanted to read that to you because I wanted to congratulate John Greaney personally for all that he has done for intelligence and for AFIO. And I'd like to congratulate the new Executive Director, Dave Whipple, who I'm confident will build on John's leadership and accomplishments.

I promised earlier to tell you some of what we've been doing. And I want you to know that I deeply appreciate your strong interest in keeping up with what's happened in intelligence since the time you wrote the reports and sent the cables.

You have to be aware that while our mission has not changed, the number of people who scrutinize what we do and how we do it has grown substantially. Earlier in the luncheon, I was talking to Walter, who was telling me about his DCI saying that there wasn't enough to do with congressional affairs, and so he was also making him Assistant General Counsel, reporting to Larry as well. I recall that Dick Helms told me -- and I think it is in our figures -- that CIA then gave 175 congressional briefings on average a year. Many of you may remember when only a few classified papers went from the Agency or the Bureau or the Pentagon to either house of Congress. You may also recall that classified briefings to congressional committees were given only by the most senior officials. Today a number of congressional committees closely examine

the Intelligence Community's activities, and the number of individuals who see classified material far exceeds the restricted number of the past. We gave over 1,000 briefings last year. In my view, that's probably too many, for it increases the number of people who are required to provide this information -- some of them younger and not as prepared to take the heat that comes with this kind of responsibility.

Our relations with Congress have always involved balancing the need for a candid relationship with the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. It's my firm view that truth builds trust. But there are many things that we simply cannot safely discuss in large forums of staffers and committee members. And we have had to work these problems out. Under the current guidelines, when briefing Congress, an officer who feels uncertain about answering a particular question is instructed not to go around it, but to simply say: "I'm not authorized to answer that question, but I'll take it up at headquarters." And I think this approach is working. I've got some beautiful bruises and I've had a few battles, not all of which I've won, but we have managed to protect our sources and our methods in this way. And I think we are building a relationship that is built upon trust, knowing that what we provide, we provide carefully and truthfully. And we work with the committee chairman and vice chairman in trying to limit those things that should only be shared with a very few people, often only the chairman and vice chairman themselves.

Another area that commands enormous press attention is the use of covert action. I want you to know that I support covert action. I believe it is

extremely important for us to have this capability to help implement our nation's foreign policy in those areas where overt action simply will not work. And I have consistently conveyed my support for this to the Congress and to others who are interested. I think it's important for us to have a managed covert action, so that we can defend what we do and demonstrate that it was done with the approval of the policymakers of the country, including the President, after careful consideration on our part, and that we should not be accused of being loose cannons, for we are actually a very vital part of our nation's foreign policy.

On February 15th of this year we had a little party at the Agency. Many intelligence officers from the community were there. It was the day that the

STAT Soviets completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

STAT

Well these, of course, are some of our bread-and-butter issues and my views of how they are changing. The changing requirements of congressional oversight, the continued importance of protecting sources and methods, and the continuing need for covert action are probably no surprise to you.

I'd like to spend a little time looking at several other current issues where we do see some change. There has been a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of subjects the Intelligence Community is now required to address, the number of consumers who use our product, and the resources we need to provide what is asked of us.

STAT

STAT it will not surprise you that we are interested in both the political and the economic stability of countries in all regions of the world. We are also concentrating on

interdisciplinary problems such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, technology transfer, and hostile intelligence activities.

Interagency efforts have become and will continue to be increasingly important. In addition to the work being done by the Intelligence Community staff and the interagency working groups, I have supported and established a number of centers to coordinate our efforts in key areas. It simply is required today. Centers in counterterrorism and counterintelligence pull together analysis and operations and have produced impressive results.

During the past four years there have been nearly [ ] cases in which some form of counterterrorist actions -- efforts to prevent terrorism, notifications of threats, and so on -- were taken on the basis of intelligence information disseminated by the Intelligence Community. Now we can't say that in all those cases the information we provided or the measures we took were solely responsible for the preventions, but they clearly had a role and that's important to us. The investigation of the explosion on Pan Am 103 is another example of how the Counterterrorist Center is working with other components of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. I think they are doing an exceptional job of reconstructing the cause and the nature of the explosion and pulling together the information that points to who may be responsible. 25X1

One of the concerns that I have, frankly, is that policymakers may become impatient with the process and begin to make open statements about those believed to be responsible without having considered the implications of such accusations on our foreign policy and how we will proceed from such conclusions.

Last April, I established a Counterintelligence Center to improve the effectiveness of counterintelligence activities within both the CIA and the Intelligence Community. The Center works to protect our foreign operations and the security of our components against penetration by foreign security or intelligence services. This is a matter of great concern both for us and for Congress, and I believe that we have gotten out in front of the curve on this. I recently talked about these issues with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and I pointed out that despite the political and economic changes underway in the Soviet Union, we have no evidence that the force of their intelligence effort has abated. If anything, it has increased, although it appears to be taking a less visibly confrontational form.

In counternarcotics, we have seen a bit of the future and have even watched it arrive. And again, in an effort to be out in front of the curve, and to be ready to assist Bill Bennett, we have established a Counternarcotics Center to better integrate our intelligence efforts. You may not have known that more than 30 government agencies are involved in our national program to fight drugs and the Intelligence Community provides information to well over half of them. It's been a disorganized effort within CIA; important and valuable work was being done by the various directorates, but without any real coordination or any real sense of thrust, because narcotics had not been thought to be a central part of our mission. But with the 1988 elections, in which both political parties made narcotics perhaps the most important and central issue, it was clear that the Intelligence Community would have to reassess the priority that it was giving to the issue and consider a more

coordinated and effective way of operating. I have met with Bill Bennett and talked with him a number of times, and I am confident that the Intelligence Community will continue to have a role -- and have an even more prominent role -- in this effort. Many problems face us in this area. The use of intelligence in law enforcement efforts is fraught with certain kinds of problems. The use of intelligence as evidence creates problems in protecting our sources and our methods. And I think we have to make an important effort not to allow the Intelligence Community's limited resources to be consumed by producing mere tactical evidence -- intelligence that can be supplied by others who are assigned to such work. We can, of course, through our computer spinoffs, direct tactical intelligence as we get it, and that is useful. But basically, our mission must be the broader role of intelligence -- identifying sources with information on fields, crop growth, major players in the drug enforcement effort, money laundering, and worthy intelligence of that kind -- rather than giving an increasing share of our resources to the purely tactical effort. That's going to be a matter of discussion. I wanted to talk about it with Bill Bennett and try to get him on board before he began to use his bully pulpit, which I want him to do, but not about us.

Coordinated effort continues to be key to the production of our National Intelligence Estimates. Here we make sure that the entire Intelligence Community is represented -- NSA, CIA, DIA, and all the contributing members. This process of give and take, which many of you no doubt remember, still assures us that we are giving policymakers our best assessment. Careful

analysis and coordination is our best protection from being accused of "cooking the books," both now and in the future. And we have changed some of the process so that even the greatest cynics cannot assume that anyone, particularly myself, is manipulating it to achieve a personal policymaking end.

While I cannot tell you, in this forum, the number of people who receive our publications, I can tell you that the number reflects a very substantial increase in the demand for intelligence.

And the increased demand for intelligence mirrors the Intelligence Community's increased need for resources. While we have developed sophisticated technical collection systems that provide more and better data, we must recognize that more data is a mixed blessing. We have needed more people to sift through this data, to analyze it and tell us what it means.

I just came back from talking with people who are helping us recognize, sort through and use this increasing volume of intelligence that we are gathering through all the various means that we have. It is encouraging, but it only underscores the problem. And now with glasnost in full run in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc countries, more and more information in the public print is of interest to us, and it is becoming increasingly challenging for us to collect and absorb it all.

25X1

So it's a big challenge, but I think we're on our way to solving it.

We've also had to contend with the current budget reality, recognizing that our ability to fund programs is shrinking, while what is demanded of us

in intelligence is growing. Sometimes the choices are really heart rendering. And we do all this in a time when the President and the Administration are very supportive of intelligence and want us to have our share of the resources -- indeed, perhaps even more than a pro rata share of the resources from which our budget is drawn. But, we are trying to deal with a major deficit problem, and the money is just not going to be there as we would like it to be.

You all know that budget reductions are being made in order to reduce that deficit, and this is very much on my mind because I presented our Intelligence Community budget to the Congress quite recently. In fact, I have spoken to three congressional committees about our budget in the last three months. And I've had private meetings with senior members of the committees who had particular concerns. You know how difficult these decisions are when it comes to determining which programs must be cut or even postponed or dropped. In the Intelligence Community developing a single satellite is an entirely new program. It's not a question of dropping a squadron or an aircraft carrier, as painful as that may be. It's a question of dropping an entire program, and that makes it very, very difficult and challenging.

After a period of sustained growth in the intelligence budget, we now must do less against a worldwide intelligence challenge that has not abated to suit our tightened budget.

Perhaps the best example of our expanding responsibilities is in the area of arms control and treaty verification. The INF Treaty calls for the United States to monitor about 120 facilities inside the Soviet Union. But a START

treaty, if approved, could involve monitoring as many as 2,500 weapons locations spread throughout the Soviet Union. And if we add to that the need to support conventional arms talks and to coordinate that support with our NATO allies, we begin to see the immensity of our task -- a task that will involve all parts of the Intelligence Community.

We do, however, have a strong national security team and a President who has a great appreciation for intelligence. Many of you have known him and worked with him and you know that he understands intelligence and he believes in it. He wants to keep it away from policymaking, but he wants to use it as the foundation for determining policy. During his eight years as Vice President, he was briefed every morning by officers from the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. And now, as President, he continues to receive daily briefings from our current intelligence people. I was with him this morning. The President is very good at taking in the information, asking the tough questions, and making sure that we are tasked to keep him up to speed in the areas of interest to him.

Our relationships with Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney have been excellent. As you might expect, we also have an excellent working relationship with Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates.

Another intelligence professional that I've been working closely with since I first arrived at the Agency -- and someone whom many of you know -- is Dick Kerr. Dick has been an important part of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community for nearly 30 years, serving as an analyst, a manager, a member of the Intelligence Community staff, and Deputy Director for

two different directorates within the Agency. And now, I'm depending upon him as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to help me ensure that policymakers have the information that they need. I thought that it was another nice signal that President Bush took time to come to participate in Dick Kerr's swearing-in as Deputy Director.

Not only do we have talented officers, but we continue to attract top people who want to join us. At the CIA alone, some 100,000 men and women each year express an interest in working for intelligence. And the actual applications are coming in at the rate of 1,000 a month. You have no doubt read about the protests on some college campuses where CIA recruits. Interestingly enough, these protests and the publicity they generate often work in our favor. Our recruitment centers are inundated with resumes after every campus demonstration. But we're not responsible for the demonstrations.

I've tried to make a point of testing the waters myself. And in the last two years I have visited a number of college campuses, including Dartmouth and Yale, where protest activity has not been uncommon. I have been treated with respect and interest, and people invariably come up to see me after the program to talk about their personal interest in pursuing a career in intelligence.

The Intelligence Community is selective, and with good reason. We offer an opportunity to be part of a mission -- a mission that instills a sense of purpose and provides a sense of accomplishment. There are sacrifices as well. Intelligence is, more than most services, dependent upon individual acts of patriotism, offered without expectation of personal glory.

Last December, President Bush, then President-elect Bush, came back to the Central Intelligence Agency. He spent about three hours with us, receiving briefings, renewing acquaintances, having lunch with some of our young stars at the GS-14 and -15 level. His visit stirred personal memories. And I think one of his most poignant moments was spent as he stopped with Brent Scowcroft and John Sununu in our headquarters foyer to gaze at the stars which represent our fallen comrades -- clearly touched by their courage, remembering their lasting contributions.

In the last two years, I have visited over [ ] intelligence facilities here and abroad. I've seen tremendously important work being done by dedicated men and women -- scientists, linguists, clandestine operators, the whole range of talents. And in a society that is open, delivering on our mission in a secret way is quite a challenge. And I have the greatest admiration for the men and women who are willing to accept the enormous responsibilities of intelligence and still keep the secrets of their successes. STAT

My association here with AFIO has made me realize that intelligence is a lifelong commitment. Fulfilling the mission and keeping the secrets does not ever really end. You who have served in intelligence continue to contribute. Your programs, which promote an understanding of intelligence, have done much to build public support for our vital mission.

I hope that we will continue to attract those who are best suited to carry out our mission -- those who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are dedicated and responsive to law and discipline. People who understand and play by the rules. People who are not preoccupied by fame or fortune, but

who see in our work a way to express their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world. You in AFIO must help us find them, for this is what it is all about. This is why you served, why we serve today, and why, God willing, enormously talented and dedicated Americans will be joining us for the great challenges, not yet entirely defined, that will be waiting for us tomorrow.

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REMARKS

BY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

TIME EXECUTIVE NEWS CONFERENCE

HEADQUARTERS AUDITORIUM

APRIL 18, 1989

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I have just a few remarks to make this morning. I really came to welcome you here and to hear Roz Ridgway and some of the others whom you have gathered most wisely to talk about issues, and so my remarks will be rather unstructured and I hope you'll bear with me.

It's such a beautiful morning. I started off in the Rose Garden this morning, and it's really fun to report to someone who has had this job before. The interchange, the requests for additional information shedding light, and the interaction are stimulating to us.

We send regular briefers to the White House, and I go often to get a sense of the reaction of the President and his immediate advisors, General Scowcroft and John Sununu, and to sense whether we are doing our job and whether they are hearing our message.

We don't make policy. We try to present useful, timely, and objective intelligence to policymakers so that they can make wise decisions in the interest of our country. But we do insist that they hear it and that they not alter it, and I'll talk about that in just a moment.

STAT

There is also an awareness in our embassies that we do have things that cannot be trusted to a conventional environment. I think it makes us all a little more conscious of the importance of intelligence and counterintelligence, the hostile target working against us.

Well, this is an interesting time to be in this profession and all of the related professions, including the diplomatic profession, from whom you're going to hear today. Things are happening in the world that many would not have anticipated, and this is requiring all our best efforts. These events require all our capabilities -- our human intelligence, our signals intelligence, and our imagery intelligence -- to make sense out of what is happening and, where we can, to anticipate, both on a near term and on a long term basis, what is apt to come from those areas in which ordinary intelligence has heretofore been denied us, except by the most active clandestine efforts on our part.

The elections last month in the Soviet Union are good example of that. These were the freest elections in the Soviet Union since 1917, and citizens really had a chance to express their happiness or discontent. I think of the prominent political figure in Leningrad who was defeated without opposition. When I was a young lawyer, we used to say that the one thing we feared the most was losing an uncontested divorce suit. In the Soviet Union, people are expressing the fact that perestroika has not yet become real to them. They are not seeing the benefits of economic reform in terms of the food on their table and other quality of life improvements, whereas they are grasping quickly the opportunities of glasnost to express themselves.

And we are seeing that all over the Soviet republics -- the Baltic, the Armenian and Azerbaijani states, and more recently indications of similar activity in Georgia and in the Ukraine.

It is an exciting time for those who have followed Soviet events to try to understand what all this means. I agree with Henry Kissinger, who contends that in many cases Gorbachev does not really know what he plans to do next. He is stirring the stew, creating opportunities for new solutions, without what we would consider to be a long-term game plan. And so it makes it more difficult for intelligence experts to anticipate -- and we get a lot of pressure from the White House and other places to anticipate -- what's he going to do next.

We're not bad at forecasting. We may know he's likely to announce some unilateral troop withdrawals or some unacceptable quid pro quos, such as giving up Cam Ranh Bay and Subic Bay -- things that have kept him in the political limelight, given the aura of detente and reasonableness.

At the same time, we've had great difficulty in predicting with specificity what he's going to do. And I think one of the reasons is he doesn't know what he's going to do very far ahead of what he does. But it's very effective.

We try in intelligence to look not just at political issues, but at economic capabilities as well. Political issues, though, are important because there is so much focus on this man and perestroika and reform in the way they're describing.

And with all the arms talks, a considerable amount of our resources are dedicated to arms control and that companion question, the ability to monitor or verify arms agreements, which is crucial in terms of congressional ratification of treaties and public acceptance. This puts the Intelligence Community very much on the spot as we try as objectively as we can to tell the Congress the level of confidence that we have in our ability to monitor agreements as they are being negotiated. We worked our way through the INF Treaty. The START negotiations present enormously magnified problems for us.

You may think that we're spending all of our time on the Soviet Union. That's not true. Historically, we've spent between 85 and 90 percent of our resources in this area, and we may be working our way back up to that, thanks to Gorbachev.

But more recently, the activities in other parts of the world -- and you'll hear about some of that this morning -- have commanded a good deal of our attention. We call those Third World or regional developments and occasionally regional conflicts. We see them -- the events in Africa, in Latin America, in the Far East, especially in Cambodia. And we're watching economic developments as well.

Bruce mentioned my concern about biological and chemical warfare and the proliferation of that capability along with missiles in the Middle East, and that is a major concern. And I surfaced it not to suggest a policy, but to develop an awareness of what was otherwise being legitimized by silence while the Iraqis and Iranians were killing each other with chemical weapons. Every other nation in the Middle East was trying to develop chemical weapons for

themselves, because they saw a good, cheap deal and they wanted to take advantage of it.

Added to the regional conflicts, regional developments, and of course the main Soviet problem, are the transnational issues of counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence. These are taking up a good deal of our time. We've reorganized the Agency and the Intelligence Community efforts to be able to produce a better and more timely result for our government, and I think that we are staying ahead of this curve, particularly the Bill Bennett curve. I want to be sure the Intelligence Community is ready, willing, and able to serve, because I don't want to be at the other end of his whiplash when he mounts his bully pulpit to say what's wrong with what has heretofore been a not too well coordinated drug effort around the world. We're taking our place in that. We know where we can help, and the new Counternarcotics Center is the Intelligence Community's contribution to the effort.

Well, these are some of the things that are keeping our attention. We are not just here at Langley. The Intelligence Community is much broader. The National Security Agency, NSA, has more employees than we do and is doing magnificent work in cryptology and signals intelligence at Fort Meade and other places.

We have the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Department of State, INR, has its own very helpful and useful intelligence and analytical capabilities. And each of the military services is working to have a better understanding, primarily in defensive and offensive warfare -- we call some of that indications and warnings. I might take just a minute to mention what I mean

by that, because it's vitally important and it's geared to some of the things that Gorbachev is doing now.

When Gorbachev says he's pulling his tanks back, when he's removing his bridge-crossing equipment, when he's taking 500,000 troops back into Russia, he is telling us that the warning period is going to expand. We are in a much better position to deal with force structure, with threat, with all the problems that go with the tension of not knowing when a major assault from the enemy could occur. So we're busy developing our ability to detect changes, adverse changes, little things that might signal to our defense forces that the Soviets are getting ready to do something hostile in our direction. And the military services work very closely with us.

We call all this the Intelligence Community. I think the Intelligence Community is working better together than it has for a long, long time. The leaders of the Intelligence Community meet on a regular basis, as do the ordinary Intelligence Community Staff sections, not only to devise among ourselves the manner in which our overall budget will be applied for the most benefit to the country, but also to shake out the little problems, turf problems, other kinds of problems to avoid unnecessary redundancy and become more effective.

We are talking together, and I think we are talking together very well. As a part of that, we have the National Intelligence Council, made up of National Intelligence Officers who are specialists in major fields and who produce the National Intelligence Estimates, which are the broader-gauge look at the major intelligence problems around the world.

And as a community, we pass judgment on these estimates, reflecting the differences of view and nuances that each intelligence agency wants to record in the estimates, putting them where the reader can find them, not burying them, and then submitting them to the policymakers, who are asked to read it, to understand it, to take our material -- use it, throw it away, do anything but change it. In that way, I think the old expression of "cooking the books" can go out the window. I haven't heard that expression since I've been here, and I don't intend to hear it.

We want to be as useful as we can in the way I have described. We give the Congress 1,000 briefings a year, which may come as some surprise to you. It certainly did to me. And I'm not sure that may not be too many. But it is important that we be responsive to the Congress and at the same time protect the responsibility that we have to guard our sources and our methods. It's just a function of numbers: when too many people know about things that are required to be kept secret, the risk of such information finding its way into the hands of those who have a right to print it expands.

And so we are working to make sure that the oversight committees of the Congress and the Intelligence Community closely coordinate secrets, always telling the truth, but not telling things that are at greatest risk. I won't go into how I do that with the leadership, but so far I think it's working.

You are going to hear about East-West relations and North-South relations from policymakers and intelligence experts, and I hope to be here for part of it because I'm very much interested in what they're going to say.

And on behalf of the Intelligence Community, I want to thank all of you who have taken time from your busy agendas and your companies to try to understand a little more about what is happening in the world and what our major problems are, so that you, too, can lend some support to us.

Many of you are already providing the Intelligence Community with your assessments of meetings of leaders and businessmen in other parts of the world -- assessments that would not be available to the ordinary spy, but are available because of glasnost and other access and business relationships. And these help us to understand better what is going on in the world, so that we can make our intelligence analysis more useful to the Administration.

So I want to close by thanking you for what you do for us. Welcome to "The Bubble."

REMARKS

BY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AT THE

PRESENTATION OF THE BAKER AWARD TO ADMIRAL BOBBY R. INMAN

SECURITY AFFAIRS SUPPORT ASSOCIATION

BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE

JUNE 1, 1989

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Thank you John.* I want to thank you for giving me a second chance. Last year, as you know, I had the interesting experience of giving the award to someone who wasn't here. Dr. Baker very generously stood in for Dr. Land. This year Dr. Baker is not here. He said he has already heard me.

The only condition under which I would agree to officiate at this award ceremony was that a real live "in the flesh" awardee be present, and that I have some say as to who it might be. I gave my recommendation to John on a piece of paper, and he said, "This is an interesting coincidence, but otherwise, we wouldn't pay any attention to you at all."

Well, it's a real privilege to be with you here tonight to honor Admiral Bobby Inman, the recipient of the William Oliver Baker Award and a good friend and colleague for over a decade.

For nearly 40 years, Bobby's vision, integrity, and unique understanding of the capabilities, and indeed the limitations, of intelligence have been of inestimable value to our national security. Many people say, and I would certainly agree, that Bobby Inman is one of the finest intelligence professionals this country has ever seen. Known for his incisive mind and his straight talk, he has often been referred to in press reports as a "national asset," as though he were some sort of secret weapon. But I think one of Bobby's former colleagues in government spoke for many of us when he said, "I'm just glad that guy is on our side."

During his remarkable career, he has been involved in all the major disciplines of intelligence -- collection, processing, analysis, and

* John McMahon, president of the Security Affairs Support Association.

production. His contributions have had a profound and lasting impact on our national security, as well as on how the Intelligence Community is viewed by Congress and the general public. And at every stage of his career, Bobby has firmly believed that the Intelligence Community can provide this country with the quality of intelligence that it needs, through a process of laws and rules that protect the rights of American citizens.

Bobby's intellect and capacity for hard work were evident long before he entered the world of intelligence. Back in his hometown of Rhonseboro, Texas, they still remember him as a "whiz kid" on a local radio quiz show. Neighbors recall that he seemed to read everything in sight, which, as many of you know, is still the case.

Commissioned as an ensign in 1952, Bobby's early assignments in the Navy took him to Korea, Paris, and London. He also attended the Navy's intelligence school in Washington where he learned his trade -- fitting together the bits and pieces of information that form the large mosaic of intelligence.

In 1958, when there were indications that mainland China might invade Taiwan, he made a contribution to naval operations that few men could have. One night while Bobby was on duty, one of the three commanders who regularly briefed Admiral Arleigh Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations, scanned a stack of intelligence reports, provided quick comments, and then left. Based on the commander's cursory analysis of these reports, Admiral Burke began dispatching warships, until word came back that the information was wrong. Bobby was called before Admiral Burke, and he was able to recall each of

the hundreds of dispatches he had read that night, and he answered the Admiral's questions. From then on, Bobby was the Chief of Naval Operations' intelligence briefer.

Much has been written over the years about Bobby's capacity for total recall, and there are some who say they have never known him to forget anything. I hope that's not true. A senior White House aide once said, "I'd tell you he had a photographic memory, but it's better than that. A photograph takes time to develop. Inman's like a Polaroid. Instant."

The top brass took note of his quick mind and dedication, and by 1974 he was named Director of Naval Intelligence, the top job in his field. Two years later, he was promoted from one star to three, becoming the youngest vice admiral in the peacetime history of the Navy at that time. After serving as Vice Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bobby was named Director of the National Security Agency, a post he held for nearly four years.

Admiral Bill Studeman tells a story about Bobby's first days at NSA, when an executive assistant left a massive amount of documents on his desk. The assistant expected that the paperwork would occupy Bobby for at least several days -- a bureaucratic trick that I've seen many times -- but he disposed of the material in an hour and asked for more.

As Director of NSA, Bobby recognized the vital importance of assessing foreign military capabilities. But he stressed that political and economic intelligence had an increasing impact on national security as well. One of his top priorities was timeliness -- making sure that information was collected, processed, and disseminated as quickly as possible.

It was during this time that Bobby enhanced what was already an outstanding reputation with Congress. A master of the Hill's complex budgeting process, he often testified at appropriations hearings without notes. Senator Barry Goldwater, former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called Bobby the most articulate budget explainer he had ever heard. Senator Al Gore said that Bobby's greatest talent "was to take complicated issues and clarify, clarify, clarify." One Capitol Hill observer noted that after "just two tight" paragraphs of testimony by Bobby on the Hill, a senator would "have what he had been after, with maybe a lesson in Russian history or English literature in the bargain."

In what Bobby has called "the smoothest job of arm-twisting I've ever encountered," President Reagan persuaded him to serve as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in 1981. In accepting that post, he was given a fourth star, becoming the first intelligence officer to attain that level. Few could argue with what Barry Goldwater told Bobby at his confirmation hearing: "If there's any such thing as the right man for the job at the right time, you're that man. I don't know a man in the business who is better than you."

Bobby articulated his expectations and goals at a meeting with CIA employees soon after he took office. He said the Agency should place the highest priority on the quality of its output, on trying to be as precise as it could. He emphasized the importance of rewarding those who were willing to take personal risks in their own judgments.

Another top priority, he said, was justifying this nation's long-term intelligence needs, prioritizing those needs, and then getting the Administration and Congress to support them. Bobby was the driving force behind a five-year intelligence capabilities study which stood as a blueprint for the future -- a study that was adopted and has proven to be right on target.

He played a key role in shaping the instruments that guide and support the DCI in leading the Intelligence Community. He restructured the National Foreign Intelligence Board so that this senior Intelligence Community advisory body could be more useful in the production of timely and policy-relevant national estimates.

Bobby also made a major contribution to the drafting of Executive Order 12333. He said the standards established by the order were vital for two reasons: first, there must be no doubt that the rights of Americans will be respected and preserved during the course of intelligence activities that may affect them. And second, professional intelligence officers deserve to be told, in as clear terms as possible, the proper limits of their activities.

He strongly spoke out about the need in today's world to protect some information, including intelligence sources, methods, and sensitive technical and scientific material. In pointing out that every nation's progress and security are tied up with science and technology, he often emphasized that the interests of national security and science could best be advanced through a joint effort.

Bobby had said he had only intended to serve as Deputy Director for 18 to 24 months, and he stuck to this timetable, stepping down in June of 1982.

After his plans to resign were announced, he told CIA employees, "...If I have any strong message to leave with you, it's that you've got to work constantly at ensuring Congress knows enough to do its oversight job about how you do your work, and that they know enough about your needs to understand where you need help." In reluctantly accepting Bobby's resignation, President Reagan thanked him for his "leadership and wise counsel."

Although he left public service in 1982, Bobby still works to promote the security of this nation. And whenever our government has asked for help, he has answered the call. In 1984, Bobby was named to head the Secretary of State's advisory panel on overseas security, which recommended ways to protect our embassies against terrorist attacks. And early last year, Frank Carlucci asked Bobby to head a scientific advisory board on verifying strategic arms accords.

I've come to know quite a few intelligence officers over the years, and many of them have been outstanding. But I can't think of anyone in intelligence who is more highly respected and trusted than Bobby Inman. Throughout his career, he has sharpened our vision, increased our understanding, and provided invaluable support to policymakers so that they can make wise decisions. Yet perhaps just as important, he has understood the importance of maintaining the great trust that this nation places in our use of secrecy within a democracy of laws and personal freedom.

One of Bobby's old colleagues on the Council on Foreign Relations remarked, "There are very few Bobby Inmans in any society, in any point in

history." In every post he has served -- and in every project he has undertaken -- Bobby has made a difference. All of us who have benefited from his knowledge, his integrity, and his enormous contributions to our national security join me in saying, "Bobby, well done. We salute you."

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